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SETTLEMENTS BETWEEN BRAND AND GENERIC

PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES:
A REASONABLE ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF

REVERSE PAYMENTS
Anne-Marie C. Yvon, Ph.D.*
INTRODUCTION

Imagine that CureCo, Inc., is the exclusive seller of a patented product
that yields hundreds of millions of dollars per year in revenues. CopyCo
International announces its intention to market the product and compete
with CureCo. CureCo promptly sues CopyCo for patent infringement. A
federal court holds that the patent is invalid, appearing to clear the way for
CopyCo to enter the market; however, CureCo appeals the decision. Before
the appeal is concluded, the parties enter into a settlement agreement in
which CureCo, the plaintiff, pays CopyCo, the defendant, twenty-one
million dollars to refrain from marketing the product until the expiration of
the invalid patent, preserving CureCo's exclusive hold on the market. Now
imagine that the product is a life-saving chemotherapy drug. Over the
vehement objections of consumers, public interest groups, and antitrust
enforcers, the settlement is deemed legal by a federal district court, whose
decision is affirmed by the court of appeals.
These are the facts of a recent case' that took place amid growing
criticism of the pharmaceutical industry. 2 Rising drug costs, 3 doubts about
drug safety, 4 aggressive advertising to consumers, 5 and questionable

* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
family for their unconditional love and tireless support through many, many years of school.
I would also like to thank my advisor, Professor Edward Cavanagh of St. John's University
School of Law, for his guidance and advice.
1. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2005). This
opinion was amended and superseded by In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466

F.3d 187 (Fed. Cir. 2006), which predominantly made changes and corrections to the
citations in the original opinion, but did not modify the court's analysis or holding.
2. See Alex Berenson, Big Drug Makers See Sales Erode with Their Image, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 14, 2005, at Al.
3. See Milt Freudenheim, Drug Prices Up Sharply This Year, N.Y. Times, June 21,
2006, at Cl.
4. See Berenson, supra note 2.
5. See Stephanie Saul, Drug Makers to Police Consumer Campaigns, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 3, 2005, at C7.

1883

1884

FORDHAMLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

marketing practices to physicians 6 have precipitated a lack of consumer
confidence in pharmaceutical companies. 7 In an effort to lower health care
costs, consumer advocacy groups are increasingly active in challenging the
tactics that brand-name pharmaceutical companies use to prevent generic
competition. 8 These efforts are complicated by the fact that the law for
evaluating these tactics is unsettled.
A potential conflict between antitrust law and patent law occurs when
brand and generic pharmaceutical companies-potential competitors in the
same market--enter into settlement agreements to resolve patent
infringement suits.
These settlement agreements fall into several
categories, the most prevalent of which involves so-called "reverse
payments" from the patent holder to the alleged infringer, typically in
exchange for the alleged infringer's agreement to delay market entry of a
pharmaceutical product or line of products. 9 Such arrangements between
brand and generic pharmaceutical companies, particularly the unusual flow
of compensation from plaintiff to defendant, may seem counterintuitive, but
the arrangements arise, in part, as a result of a complex regulatory scheme
that governs the approval of generic drugs. 10 It is this regulatory structure,
and the motivations it fosters, that make these settlements both attractive to
the parties and a red flag to antitrust enforcers.ll
While public policy favors settlement of complex and costly patent
disputes over litigation of such disputes, courts must ensure that the
settlements do not circumvent antitrust laws.' 2
Courts are divided
regarding the proper antitrust analysis of these agreements in the context of
patent litigation settlements. In one of the earliest cases to examine the
issue, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that an agreement
in which a generic manufacturer refrained from marketing its product in
exchange for payment by the brand company constituted a horizontal

6. See Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers Are Still Giving Gifts to Doctors,F.D.A. Officials
Tell Senators, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2005, at A15.
7. See Berenson, supra note 2.
8. See Robert Pear, AARP Wants Bigger Role in PrescriptionDrug Cases, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 23, 2002, at A14.
9. See Mark L. Kovner et al., Applying the Noerr Doctrine to PharmaceuticalPatent
Litigation Settlements, 71 Antitrust L.J. 609, 613-14 (2003). These payments made by the

brand company are also called "exclusion payments" or "exit payments." See, e.g., Valley
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro I1), 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

10. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 390-91 (2d Cir. 2005)
(noting that "reverse payments are particularly to be expected in the drug-patent context
because the Hatch-Waxman Act created an environment that encourages them").
11. See id.; In re Schering-Plough Corp. (Schering I), No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651, at
*18 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2929 (2006); Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for PharmaceuticalCompetition,

39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 11, 19 (2004).
12. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n (Schering II), 402 F.3d
1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006); Asahi Glass Co. v.
Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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arrangement to eliminate competition and thus was illegal per se. 13 In
contrast, a few months later in a similar case, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
the per se approach, 14 and instead formulated a novel, three-part test to
evaluate the parties' antitrust liability. 15 The Eleventh Circuit has reiterated
and applied the three-part test in subsequent cases. 16 In a third jurisdiction,
Judge David G. Trager of the Eastern District of New York, applied a
traditional rule-of-reason analysis and determined that, on balance, the
defendants' agreement did not impermissibly restrain competition in the
relevant market. 17 In an unrelated case, the Second Circuit subsequently
agreed with the analysis employed by Judge Trager.1 8 There are dozens of
similar cases-mainly class actions-pending in at least four other federal
district courts. 19 The U.S. Supreme Court declined the opportunity to set a
unifying standard for analyzing patent infringement settlements when20 it
recently denied a petition for certiorari in FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp.
A consistent rule for evaluating patent infringement settlements in the
context of antitrust law is needed. Part I of this Note reviews the basic
principles of antitrust law, the basic principles of patent law, and the tension
between the two systems. Part I also explains the types of agreements at
issue and the unique regulatory scheme under which these agreements arise.
Part II surveys the analyses that federal courts have used to determine the
legality of patent infringement settlements, particularly settlements
involving payments from the infringement plaintiff to the infringement
defendant, referred to herein as "reverse payments." Part III proposes an
analytical framework that takes into account the goals of both antitrust law
and patent law.

13. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
14. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311 (11 th Cir. 2003).
15. Id. at 1312.
16. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1235 (1 lth Cir. 2005); ScheringII,
402 F.3d at 1066.
17. Cipro II, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
18. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 396-97 (2d Cir. 2005).
19. See, e.g., Dik Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 1:06CV550 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 21,
2006); Burlington Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 1:06CV545 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 18,
2006); SAJ Distrib., Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 1:06CV518 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 8, 2006);
SAJ Distrib., Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-03450 (E.D. Pa. filed Aug. 4, 2006); Parker
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 1:06CV504 (S.D. Ohio filed July 31, 2006); Williams v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 1:06CV503 (S.D. Ohio filed July 31, 2006); CVS Pharmacy,
Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 1:06CV427 (S.D. Ohio filed July 5, 2006); Pa. Employees
Benefit Trust Fund v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-02883 (E.D. Pa. filed June 30, 2006);
Langan v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-02507 (E.D. Pa. filed June 13, 2006); Scheckner v.
Sanofi-Aventis, No. 1:06CV339 (S.D. Ohio filed June 5, 2006); J M Smith Corp. v.
Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-02146 (E.D. Pa. filed May 22, 2006); Pa. Tpk. Comm'n v.
Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-02020 (E.D. Pa. filed May 12, 2006); Vista Healthplan, Inc. v.
Sanofi-Aventis, No. 1:06CV226 (S.D. Ohio filed Apr. 20, 2006); Walgreen Co. v. Warner
Chilcott Holdings Co., No. 1:06CV00494 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 15, 2006); CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 2:01CV01652 (D.N.J. filed Oct. 12, 2004).
20. FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp. (ScheringIII), 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
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I. THE SPECIAL CASE OF PHARMACEUTICALS: CONFLICTS AND
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ANTITRUST LAW AND PATENT LAW

A. The Tension Between the Antitrust and Patent Systems
If one considers the basic premise of antitrust law to be the protection
and stimulation of competition, in part by the prohibition of monopolies,
then the granting of a legal monopoly in the form of a patent would seem to
thwart that goal. 2 1 Courts have discussed this tension in trying to balance
antitrust and intellectual property concerns when considering potential
violations of the Sherman Act in view of an intellectual property owner's
right to exclude. 22 On the one hand, it is clear that a patent does not bestow
upon its owner the right to violate the antitrust laws. 23 On the other hand,
the enforcement of exclusionary rights by a patent owner is not an antitrust
violation. 24 Therefore, courts are left in the position of determining when
exclusionary action by a patentee exceeds the scope of the legal monopoly
granted under the patent. 2 5 The tension between antitrust law and patent
regulatory
law is further complicated in the pharmaceutical industry by the
26
drugs.
generic
of
marketing
and
approval
the
scheme governing
In spite of the seemingly incongruous objectives of the two systems, Part
III of this Note proposes that perhaps the goals of antitrust law and patent
law are not so disparate after all. Prior to reaching that resolution, however,
a discussion of the doctrine and rationale underlying each of these areas of
law, along with an explanation of the operation and effects of the regulatory
system governing the pharmaceutical arena, is necessary.
B. Basic Principles ofAntitrust Law
1. The Sherman Act and Antitrust Analysis
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract,
combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the

21. See In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 385-86.
22. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979); In re
Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 386; In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216
(9th Cir. 1997).
23. See In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 386 (citing United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374
U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963)); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1325; Image Technical
Servs., Inc., 125 F.3d at 1216.
24. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1325; image Technical Servs., Inc., 125
F.3d at 1216.
25. See Schering II, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (1 lth Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2929
(2006); Image Technical Servs., Inc., 125 F.3d at 1216; Cipro I,363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 540
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
26. In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 386. The Hatch-Waxman amendments to the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act are discussed below. See infra Part I.D.2.
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The Supreme Court has

construed section 1 to apply only to unreasonable restraints of trade, rather
than to every agreement in restraint of trade. 2 8 In determining whether a
contract unreasonably restrains trade in violation of section 1, courts
generally engage in one of three levels of antitrust inquiry: (1) a per se rule
of illegality for restraints that are obviously anticompetitive; (2) a "quicklook" approach for restraints that have pro-competitive justifications; or (3)
a "rule-of-reason" analysis for restraints that require a more extensive
balancing of their pro- and anticompetitive effects. 29 The boundaries
between these categories of analysis are not fixed; rather, these approaches
"are best viewed as a continuum, on which the amount and range of
information needed to evaluate a restraint varies depending on how highly
suspicious and how unique the restraint is." '30 At one end of the spectrum
lies the relatively lenient and fact-intensive rule of reason, while the stricter
per se rules lie at the other end, and the quick-look analysis occupies an
31
intermediate position.
The rule-of-reason analysis was classically defined by Justice Louis
Brandeis in 1918:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting a particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are
all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge
of intent may2 help the court to interpret facts and to predict
3
consequences.
Courts apply the rule of reason as a three-part analysis with shifting burdens
of proof.33 As the first step, the plaintiff must demonstrate that "the
challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a
whole in the relevant market. '34 The defendant then has the burden of
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).

28. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Arizona v. Maricopa County
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982).
29. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1311 (S.D.
Fla. 2005) (citing Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 508-09 (4th
Cir. 2002)); Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property
Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 1728 (2003)).
30. Cont7 Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d at 509 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Jennifer E. Gladieux, Comment, Towards a Single Standardfor Antitrust: The Federal
Trade Commission's Evolving Rule of Reason, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 471, 492 (1997).
31. In re Terazosin, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1311-12.
32. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
33. Cipro Il, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

34. Id.
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showing that the action has "pro-competitive redeeming virtues. '35 If such
virtues are established, "the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved through an alternative
means that is less restrictive of competition." 3 6 Furthermore, as part of the
first step, the court must determine the relevant product and geographic
markets and whether the defendant had power in those markets, i.e., the
power to raise prices or reduce output. 37 While an affirmative finding is not
38
dispositive, it is indicative of the defendant's ability to injure competition.
On the other end of the analytical continuum are agreements that are
condemned as illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act because
they are so clearly anticompetitive. 39 These generally include "horizontal"
arrangements-those between direct competitors in the defined market.
Particular horizontal agreements that are condemned per se are horizontal
price-fixing, 40 horizontal allocation of markets, 4 1 and horizontal refusals to
deal. 42 In such cases, a full inquiry into market power and anticompetitive
effects would be nothing more than a waste of resources because the
competitive harm is so obvious and the competitive benefit, if any, is so
43
minimal.
Per se rules in the antitrust context have the same advantages as all
bright-line rules-they provide clarity, predictability, efficiency, and
judicial convenience. 44 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has been cautious
about formulating new per se rules, 45 or extending existing rules to novel
areas of law. 46 Per se rules are more frequently applied to arrangements
between direct competitors (in a "horizontal" relationship) than to
arrangements between parties on different levels of the supply chain, for

35. Id.

36. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993).
38. Cipro II, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 521 (citing Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley
Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 1993)).
39. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
40. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
41. E.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); United States v. Topeo
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951).
42. E.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
43. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 29, at 1730.
44. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723-24 (1988); FTC
v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986).
46. See Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 349 n.19 (noting "the established

position that a new per se rule is not justified until the judiciary obtains considerable rule-ofreason experience with the particular type of restraint challenged"); id. at 364 (Powell, J.,

dissenting) ("[Tihe per se label should not be assigned without carefully considering
substantial benefits and procompetitive justifications. This is especially true when the
agreement under attack is novel."); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261
(1963).
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47
example, manufacturers and distributors (in a "vertical" relationship).
The reason for more stringent treatment of horizontal arrangements is that
cooperation between direct competitors is more likely to lead to higher
prices and lower output without any concomitant consumer benefit than is
cooperation between firms that share a common interest-those in the
vertical chain. 48 Only vertical restrictions on minimum resale price fixing
are illegal per se, 49 while vertical maximum price fixing,50 refusals to
deal, 51 and territorial restraints 52 are generally analyzed under a full rule of
reason.
A "quick-look" analysis lies between the rule-of-reason and the per se
rules on the antitrust analysis continuum. 5 3 This analysis is appropriate
when the challenged restraint does not fall into one of the per se categories
but the likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained by
"an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics." 54 In
such cases, the defendant may provide pro-competitive justifications for the
the
restraint, but the court can reject those reasons without undertaking
55
extensive market inquiry required by a full rule-of-reason analysis.
While these tests can be applied in a fairly straightforward manner in
traditional antitrust contexts, there is some question as to whether separate
considerations should form part of the analysis in a patent context. 56 Courts
addressing antitrust questions in the area of branded and generic
pharmaceuticals have used analyses that fall at different points along the
analytic continuum.5 7 A more consistent approach is needed.

2. Rationale of Antitrust Enforcement
In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, Justice Hugo L. Black
articulated the justifications for antitrust law:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as
the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction
of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to
47. See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. 485 U.S. at 724.
48. See id. at 724-25; United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
49. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John. D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
50. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
51. E.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
52. See, e.g., Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
53. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1312 (S.D.
Fla. 2005).
54. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
55. See id. at 770-71.
56. See, e.g., Schering 11, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
2929 (2006).
57. See, e.g., Cipro II, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 524-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But
even were that premise open to5 8question, the policy unequivocally laid
down by the Act is competition.
Although not stated so eloquently or comprehensively as Justice Black's
assessment, commentators and scholars have also offered several policy

explanations for the development and enforcement of antitrust laws.
One policy is to protect consumers from artificially high prices. 59 The

consumer-welfare goals of antitrust doctrine are most commonly viewed
through the lens of economic efficiency, an approach that is known as the
"Chicago school" of antitrust analysis. 60 Chicago school theorists posit

that, under monopoly conditions, resources are not allocated efficiently
because a consumer who would have purchased the resource at a
competitive price may not purchase it at the monopoly price, either
foregoing the resource entirely or substituting a less desirable product. 6 1 As
62
such, output is lower and prices are higher than in a competitive market.

Another consumer-welfare goal, although not a universally accepted one, is
the prevention of wealth transfer from the consumer to the monopolist in
63
excess of that which would occur in a competitive market.
In addition to protecting consumers through maximization of efficiency,

antitrust law also protects competition between smaller firms and prevents

predatory behavior by dominant firns. 64 This limits the concentration of
65
power in a given market, thereby reducing the risk of monopolization.
Combining the consumer-welfare aspects with seeming favoritism toward

small businesses, antitrust laws stimulate competition to benefit both
consumers and market participants alike.
A further benefit of competition is increased innovation. 66
In a
competitive market, firms vie to develop and advance new or improved

58. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
59. See Lawrence A. Sullivan & Warren S. Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An
Integrated Handbook 11-15, 19 (2000), reprinted in Trade Regulation 2, 3 (Robert Pitofsky
et al. eds., 5th ed. 2003); Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev.
1696, 1703 (1986).
60. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev.
925, 933-34 (1979); Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic
Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1214, 121415 (1977); Gladieux, supra note 30, at 475-76.
61. Sullivan & Grimes, supra note 59, at 3; see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy
and the Social Cost of Monopoly, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 371, 371-72 (1993) (defining "deadweight
loss" as "a loss caused principally by the fact that consumers make inefficient substitutions
for products that would have been their second choices in competitive markets").
62. Sullivan, supra note 60, at 1215.
63. See Sullivan & Grimes, supra note 59, at 3 (noting that although traditionalists and
post-Chicagoans accept the avoidance of wealth transfer as an antitrust goal, many members
of the Chicago school reject it as a legitimate concern of antitrust law); see also Easterbrook,
supra note 59, at 1703-04 (arguing that Congress intended the judicial system to enforce the
Sherman Act with a single goal of efficiency and not redistribution of wealth).
64. See Sullivan & Grimes, supra note 59, at 4; Gladieux, supra note 30, at 475.
65. See Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 1696.
66. Sullivan & Grimes, supra note 59, at 3-4.
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products in order to gain an edge over their competitors. 67 By contrast, a
monopolist has very little incentive toward innovation and may actually
suppress innovation in order to protect its monopoly. 6 8 Thus, the basic
goals of the antitrust system are to stimulate competition by preventing
monopolies and to promote the development of new technologies by
encouraging active, competitive markets.
C. Basic Principles ofPatentLaw
1. What Can Be Patented and What Are the Benefits to the Patent Owner?
An invention may be patented if it is a "new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof. '' 69 The claims of a patent define the scope of the invention. 70 The
claims must be novel 7' and unobvious, 72 and must be described "in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains ... to make and use the [invention], and [must] set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
73
invention."
A patent does not confer upon its owner the right to practice his
invention; rather, the patent owner is granted "the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout
the United States or importing the invention into the United States." 74 If
the invention is, or includes, a process, the patent owner can also exclude
the importation into the United States of goods made by the claimed
process outside of the United States. 75 A patent is enforceable for twenty
years from the earliest filing date in the United States of the patent
application or of any U.S. application to which it claims the benefit of a
priority date. 76 By statute, each claim of an issued patent is presumed valid,
77
and the burden of demonstrating invalidity is on the challenging party.
Therefore, a patentee enjoys several benefits once a patent is granted.
2. Rationale for the Granting of Patents
The Constitution granted Congress the authority to establish an
intellectual property system "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
67. Id.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 4.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
See id. § 112.
See id. § 102.
See id. § 103.

73. Id. § 112.

74. Id. § 154(a)(1).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 154(a)(2). The earliest United States filing date does not include provisional
applications filed under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e). See id. § 154(a)(3).
77. See id. § 282.
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Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 7 8 Congress used this
power to enact the first federal patent laws, encompassed in the Patent Act
of 1790. 79 The rationale for establishing a patent system is threefold. 80
First, granting a limited monopoly in the form of a patent rewards the
inventor for his efforts in developing a novel product or process. 8 1 Second,
the reward of a patent provides incentive for individuals to engage in
inventive activity. 82 Finally, in order to secure a patent and the limited
monopoly it provides, the inventor must meet statutory requirements for
sufficient disclosure of the nature and scope of the invention. 83 This
disclosure places the invention in the public domain and allows others to
84
practice the invention immediately upon expiration of the patent.
Therefore, the goals of the patent system are to promote the development of
new technology by protecting the inventor from competition within the
scope of his or her claimed invention for a limited amount of time, and to
stimulate competition by requiring full disclosure of a new invention so that
others can use that knowledge to extend or create alternatives to the
invention.
D. Regulatory Requirementsfor PharmaceuticalProducts
1. Introduction
Brand-name pharmaceutical companies spend an estimated $500 million
to $1 billion in research and development (R&D) of a new drug.8 5 Only
about 0.1% of new drugs reach the stage of clinical testing in humans, and
only 20% of those (or 0.02% of the total) are ultimately approved by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for marketing. 86 According to one
study, it takes approximately twelve years from the synthesis of a new
87
chemical compound to regulatory approval of the compound.
Consequently, brand pharmaceutical companies seek to recoup not only the
financial and time costs of developing a marketable drug, but also the R&D

78. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
79. Patent Act, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (1790) (superseded 1793).
80. See Robert W. Pritchard, Note, The Future Is Now-The Case for Patent

Harmonization,20 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 291, 293 (1995).
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).

84. See Pritchard, supra note 80, at 293.
85. See Laura J. Robinson. Analysis of Recent Proposalsto Reconfigure Hatch- Waxman,

11 J. Intell. Prop. L. 47, 47 (2003); Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley III, Pandemics
and Panaceas: The World Trade Organization's Efforts to Balance PharmaceuticalPatents
and Access to AIDS Drugs, 41 Am. Bus. L.J. 353,404-05 (2004).

86. See Sherman & Oakley, supra note 85, at 404.
87. See id.
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costs of compounds that never make it out of the laboratory. 88 One of the
primary ways in which companies do so is by obtaining patent protection of
a new drug. Patent protection is valuable because it provides the company
with a legal vehicle for excluding competitors who would infringe the
patent. 89 Therefore, brand companies have great incentive to enforce and
protect their patents.
Conversely, generic companies spend far less time and resources to bring
a drug to market. 90 For example, the estimated cost of obtaining regulatory
approval of a generic drug, which a brand company has already discovered
and tested, is approximately $1 million. 9 1 In addition, as discussed below,
the regulatory scheme governing drug approval provides great incentive,
coupled with little 92
risk, for generic companies to challenge patents covering
brand-name drugs.
2. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act
Before a new drug can be marketed or sold in the United States, approval
from the FDA is required. 93 A "pioneer drug," one that has never been
approved or marketed previously, must be approved through the new drug
application (NDA) process. 94 NDA applicants are required to submit
patents covering the drug product, formulation, and/or approved methods of
use to the FDA for publication in a listing called Approved Drug Products
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as "the
'95
Orange Book."
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, 96 commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. One of
88. Jaclyn L. Miller, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act: The
Elimination of Competition Between Drug Manufacturers, 5 DePaul J. Health Care L. 91,
103-04 (2002).

89. See id. at 95; Robinson, supra note 85, at 56. Congress has made drug patents even
more valuable to their owners by extending patent terms to restore time lost in clinical trials
and regulatory approval. See id. at 53-54. In addition, Congress has provided other
incentives to drug companies in the form of additional exclusivity benefits for
pharmaceuticals that contain a new chemical entity (NCE exclusivity), that have been tested
in children (pediatric exclusivity), or that treat a disease occurring in less than 200,000
Americans (orphan drug exclusivity). See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E), 355a(b)-(c), 360cc
(Supp. III 2003); Robinson, supra note 85, at 54-55.
90. Robinson, supra note 85, at 48; Miller, supra note 88, at 104.
91. See Robinson, supra note 85, at 48; Sherman & Oakley, supra note 85, at 405.
92. See Robinson, supra note 85, at 53; infra note 105.
93. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000).
94. Id. § 355(b).
95. See id. § 355(b); Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the HatchWaxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and PharmaceuticalInnovation, 45

IDEA 165, 169 (2005). Patents submitted by the new drug application (NDA) applicant and
listed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are commonly referred to as "Orange
Book patents."
96. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).

1894

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 75

the main goals of the Act was to accelerate the process for getting generic
drugs to market. 9 7 The primary vehicle that the Act established for doing
so is an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) for regulatory approval
of generic drugs. 98 Unlike an NDA, which must include detailed
information on the drug and large-scale clinical studies, 99 an ANDA need
only demonstrate biological equivalence of the proposed drug formulation
to the approved product, without the need for extensive (and expensive)
safety and efficacy studies.' 00 Therefore, the abbreviated approval process
provides an incentive for generic manufacturers by reducing the costs and
time required for approval of a new drug. 10 1 In filing an ANDA, the
applicant must certify that (I) no patent information has been filed with the
FDA by the NDA holder; (II) any patent filed has expired; (III) any patent
filed will expire on a particular date; or (IV) the ANDA applicant's product
either does not infringe the listed patent(s) or the listed patent(s) is (are)
invalid. 10 2 An assertion by the ANDA applicant that the Orange Book
patents are invalid or not infringed is referred to as a "paragraph IV
03
certification."
An ANDA applicant making a paragraph IV certification must notify the
patent owner (who is usually the NDA holder). 104 If the patent owner files
a patent infringement action within forty-five days of receiving notice of the
paragraph IV certification, the FDA automatically delays approval of the
ANDA for thirty months.1 0 5 In the meantime, if a court finds the patent(s)
10 6
at issue invalid and/or not infringed, the thirty-month stay is lifted.
Conversely, if a court finds the patent(s) valid and infringed, approval of
97. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(l), at 14 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2647 (stating that the intention of Title 1 of the Act was "to make available more low cost
generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure").
98. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550).
99. See id. § 355(b)(1).
100. See id. § 3550); Stephanie Greene, A Prescriptionfor Change: How the Medicare
Act Revises Hatch-Waxman to Speed Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 30 J. Corp. L. 309,
314-15 (2005); Barbara J. Williams, A Prescriptionfor Anxiety: An Analysis of Three
Brand-Name Drug Companies and Delayed Generic Drug Market Entry, 40 New Eng. L.
Rev. 1, 6-7 (2005).
101. See Greene, supra note 100, at 314-15; Williams, supra note 100, at 3.
102. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
103. Williams, supra note 100, at 7-8.
104. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2)(B).
105. See id. § 3550)(5)(B)(iii). Another provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act states that
filing an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) is an act of infringement on any patent
that claims the drug, formulation, and/or method of use, if the purpose of the ANDA is "to
obtain approval ... to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug...
claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such
patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(B). This provision allows the patent owner to bring suit
before the ANDA applicant has actually made or sold the drug product. Id. Because the
infringement involved is statutory rather than actual, there is little financial risk for the
generic company in filing an ANDA because it is generally sued prior to the accrual of
damages. See id. § 271(e)(4) (providing for only injunctive relief in the absence of actual
infringement); Schering I, No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651, at * 17-18 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003),
vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
106. See 35 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
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the ANDA is delayed until the expiration date of the patent(s). 10 7 If, before
the expiration of the thirty-month stay, the patent owner obtains a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the ANDA applicant from marketing its
product, approval of the ANDA is delayed until the patent is declared by a
court to be invalid and/or not infringed, or until0 8the expiration date of the
patent if it is declared to be valid and infringed.1
An additional provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act grants an exclusivity
period to the first applicant to file an ANDA containing a paragraph IV
certification for a particular drug. 109 The FDA delays approval of
subsequent ANDAs until 180 days after the earlier of (1) the date of the
first commercial marketing of the drug under the first-to-file ANDA; or (2)
the date a court holds the challenged patent(s) invalid or not infringed by
the first ANDA applicant." 0 The exclusivity period allows the first-to-file
applicant to compete solely with the brand company for 180 days and
provides a strong incentive for generic companies "to challenge weak or
1
narrow drug patents." I
The result of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments has been a dramatic
increase in the availability of generic drugs; 112 however, some unintended
consequences have accompanied this success. For example, some brand
companies developed strategies for staggering the listing of Orange Book
patents, which resulted in multiple thirty-month stays when ANDA
applicants made paragraph IV certifications against the newly listed
patents.11 3 Such tactics could be used to delay generic entry for several
years. 114 On the generic side, the first-to-file ANDA applicant could
prevent all other generic competitors from entering the market by never

107. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II).
108. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(1II).
109. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
110. See id. Prior to the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003 (the Medicare Act), the 180-day exclusivity period was triggered by the first
district court decision, regardless of whether the decision was appealed. See Mylan Pharm.,
Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d. 30, 47 (D.D.C. 2000). The Medicare Act clarified the
language of the statute, stating that exclusivity would only be triggered by "a final decision
from which no appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has
been or can be taken." Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1102, 117 Stat. 2066, 2458 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). A generic company that markets its product prior to a
final appellate decision is said to "launch at risk" because an unfavorable ruling by an
appellate court could result in liability for damages and removal of the product from the
market. See Greene, supra note 100, at 349-50. Since the passage of the Medicare Act,
generic companies are no longer under pressure to launch at risk, as the 180-day exclusivity
period is no longer in jeopardy of expiring during appeal. See id.; infra Part I.D.3.
11. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11 th Cir. 2003); see
Derzko, supra note 95, at 195.
112. Williams, supra note 100, at 4; Beth Understahl, Note, Authorized Generics:
Careful Balance Undone, 16 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 355, 366 (2005).
113. Williams, supra note 100, at 9; Derzko, supra note 95, at 176.
114. See Williams, supra note 100, at 9; Derzko, supra note 95, at 176.
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marketing the drug itself, thereby never triggering the start of its 180-day
1 15
exclusivity period.
These particular aspects of the Hatch-Waxman scheme were of sufficient
concern to antitrust enforcers that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
initiated a comprehensive study to determine the prevalence of abuse of the
thirty-month stay and 180-day exclusivity provisions. 116 After analyzing
such factors as the frequency and results of patent infringement suits
between brand and generic pharmaceutical companies, the frequency 1of
17
district court reversals by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
the choice of venue for patent infringement cases, and market entry by
generic companies, 1 18 the FTC made two main recommendations to
Congress."1 9 The first was to allow brand companies only one thirty-month
stay against each ANDA applicant. 120 The second was to provide for FTC
review of settlement agreements in which 180-day exclusivity is
involved. 12 1 The FTC also made additional recommendations regarding
when the 180-day exclusivity period should be triggered. 12 2 Congress
responded with the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
23
Modernization Act of 2003 (the Medicare Act). 1
3. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003
Congress passed the Medicare Act, in part, to address the perceived
deficiencies of the regulatory scheme created under the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments. 124
The Medicare Act followed the FTC's first
recommendation, allowing only one thirty-month stay per ANDA for
patentees. 125 In addition, the Act requires forfeiture of the 180-day

115. See Williams, supra note 100, at 11; Derzko, supra note 95, at 196.
116. See Fed. Trade Comm'n (FTC), Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An
FTC
Study, at
i (July 2002)
[hereinafter FTC
Study],
available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
117. Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 by merging
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate division of the
United States Court of Claims. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-

164, §§ 105, 122, 96 Stat. 25,. 26-28, 36 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.). The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of patent cases from
federal district courts or from the Board of Appeals and Patent Interferences of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office. Id. § 127.
118. See FTC Study, supra note 116, at 21-23.
119. Id. at ii.
120. See id. at ii-v.
121. Seeid. at vi-viii.
122. See id. at viii-xi; see also supra note 110 (discussing when the 180-day exclusivity
period was triggered prior to the passage of the Medicare Act).
123. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.).
124. See Williams, supra note 100, at 59.
125. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act § 1101.
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exclusivity period under several circumstances.1 26 For example, the
exclusivity period is forfeited if the first-to-file ANDA applicant does not
market its drug within seventy-five days of ANDA approval or of a final,
non-appealable court decision that the Orange Book patents are invalid or
not infringed. 127 Exclusivity is also lost if the holder enters into an
agreement with another ANDA applicant, the NDA holder, or the Orange
Book patent owner and a court makes a final, non-appealable determination
that the agreement violates the antitrust laws.' 28 Perhaps most significantly,
the Medicare Act requires that agreements among ANDA applicants or
between ANDA applicants and NDA holders must be filed with the
Department of Justice and the FTC within ten days of execution. 129 These
provisions mitigate some of the antitrust implications that arise in the patent
1 30
infringement settlement context.
E. Settlements of Patent Infringement Litigation Between Brand-Name and
Generic Drug Companies
Against this background, courts have had to consider potential antitrust
violations when the NDA holder (i.e., the brand company) and the ANDA
31
applicant (i.e., the generic company) settle a patent infringement dispute.'
Several types of settlement provisions have been subject to judicial
scrutiny. Examples of agreements that the courts have examined for
antitrust violations include licensing agreements (such as those creating an
"authorized generic"132), agreements on market entry date of the generic
126. Id. § 1102.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. §§ 1112, 1113. Twenty such agreements were filed with the FTC in fiscal year
2005, sixteen of which were between brand and generic companies, while the remaining four
were among generic companies. Bureau of Competition, FTC, Agreements Filed with the
Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization
Act
of
2003,
at
2
(2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/04/fy2005drugsettlementsrpt.pdf.
130. See Williams, supra note 100, at 59.
131. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2005); Schering
II, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006); Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.,
332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); Cipro II, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re K-Dur
Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 2d 517 (D.N.J. 2004) (order granting motion to amend
complaint, denying motion to dismiss).
132. See In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 377; Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d
1227, 1231 (11 th Cir. 2005); Schering I, 402 F.3d at 1060; Cipro II, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 519;
In re K-Dur, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 525, 526 (D.N.J, 2004); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm.,
Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (N.D. Ill. 2003). A drug product licensed by a brand
company to a generic company for marketing as a generic is called an "authorized generic."
Understahl, supra note 112, at 357. Because the authorized generic is the identical product
to the already-approved brand drug, with the generic company's label replacing the brandname label, the authorized generic does not have to be separately approved by the FDA. See
id. at 374, 384. As such, it is not subject to the 180-day exclusivity provisions of the HatchWaxman Act-it cannot gain 180-day exclusivity, as the authorized generic is not the
subject of an ANDA filing, and it cannot be barred from the market during the first ANDA
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competitor, 33 and reverse payments from the brand company to the generic
company.134 These settlements can be interim agreements in the course of
the patent infringement litigation 135
or can be final agreements that dispose of
the infringement dispute entirely.
Courts and commentators offer various rationales in favor of settlement
agreements. As Judge Posner noted in Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., "The general policy of the law is to favor the
settlement of litigation .
,,136 From a public policy perspective,
settlement of complex and lengthy litigations, such as patent infringement
suits, provides cost savings to the public and courts alike.137 In addition to
receiving economic advantages, the public also benefits from a less
congested court system and from a potential increase in competition if the
settlement allows generic drug products to enter the market sooner than if
the litigation went forward. 138 From the perspective of the parties,
39
settlement saves more than just financial resources of the companies.
filer's 180-day exclusivity period. See id. at 374-75. This loophole reduces HatchWaxman's intended incentive for ANDA applicants to challenge weak innovator patents
because the first filer's 180-day exclusivity can be diluted by a later filer who settles with the
brand company to become an authorized generic, thus entering the market prior to or during
the first filer's supposed exclusivity. See id. at 375. The FTC has recently announced its
plans to undertake a study "assess[ing] the likely short- and long-run effects of market entry
by authorized generics on generic drug competition." Press Release, FTC, FTC Proposes
Study of Competitive Impacts of Authorized Generic Drugs (Mar. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/03/authgenerics.htm; see also Agency Information Collection
Activities, Comment Request, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,779 (Apr. 4, 2006). It is estimated that the
FTC will subpoena 190 brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies in the course of
the study; the FTC's report is expected toward the end of 2007. Erin Marie Daly, Drug
Industry Faces Vast Antitrust Probe, IP Law 360, Mar. 30, 2006, at 1.
133. See Schering II, 402 F.3d at 1059, 1060; Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1300; In re
Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 902; In re K-Dur, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 525, 526; Asahi Glass, 289 F.
Supp. 2d at 989.
134. Schering II, 402 F.3d at 1060-61; Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1300; In re Cardizem,
332 F.3d at 903; In re K-Dur, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 525, 526.
135. See Eric L. Cramer & Daniel Berger, The Superiority of Direct Proofof Monopoly
Power and Anticompetitive Effects in Antitrust Cases Involving Delayed Entry of Generic
Drugs, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 81, 81 (2004); James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Economic
Analyses of Patent Settlement Agreements: The Implementation of Specific Economic Tests,
the Evaluation of Dynamic Efficiency, and the Scope of PatentRights, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 57,
61(2004).
136. Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 991; see also In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 386 ("We
begin our analysis against the backdrop of our longstanding adherence to the principle that
'courts are bound to encourage' the settlement of litigation." (quoting Gambale v. Deutsche
Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004))).
137. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1308 n.20; In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2005); Schering I, No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651, at
*22 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (1Ith Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
2929 (2006).
138. In re Terazosin, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (citing In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121. 133 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)); Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler,
Efficiency Trade-Offs in PatentLitigation Settlements: Analysis Gone Astray?, 39 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 33, 39 (2004).
139. Daniel A. Crane, Ease over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, 88 Minn. L.
Rev. 698, 703-04 (2004).
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Litigation is costly in that it diverts employee focus from the running of the
business, creates public relations concerns, and affects shareholder
confidence for publicly held companies. 14 0 Moreover, some patentees may
be particularly risk averse and would prefer the certainty of settlement over
the possibility, even if small, of having its patent invalidated. 14 1 Therefore,
even if a party is relatively confident in its patent infringement position, it
may elect settlement over litigation to avoid both tangible and intangible
costs. 142

This Note focuses on the reverse payment aspect of settlement
agreements, with ancillary consideration given to entry date restrictions
accompanied by reverse payments. Part II discusses the cases involving
reverse payments that have been decided to date and the analysis that each
court has employed to evaluate the antitrust claims.
II. DISPARATE ANALYSES BY COURTS EVALUATING THE ANTITRUST
EFFECTS OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN BRAND-NAME AND
GENERIC DRUG COMPANIES

A. Per Se Approach of the Sixth Circuit: In re Cardizem
The Sixth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to consider the
legality of reverse payments. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation
involved an agreement in which a brand company, Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc. (HMR), paid a generic company, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(Andrx), not to enter the market for the cardiovascular drug Cardizem
CD. 143 Several lawsuits were filed under state and federal antitrust laws
against HMR and Andrx. 144 The plaintiffs were direct purchasers
145
(pharmacies), indirect purchasers (consumers), and class representatives.
The suits were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, and proceedings commenced in the Eastern District of
146
Michigan.
The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether the
agreement between HMR and Andrx was a per se illegal restraint of trade
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 147 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the arrangement was a "horizontal market allocation

140. See Schering I, 2003 WL 22989651, at *22; Crane, supra note 139, at 703-04;
Kovner et al., supra note 9, at 611.
141. In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 394; Crane, supra note 139, at 704.
142. See In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 394; Crane, supra note 139, at 704.
143. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 899-900 (6th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 125 S.Ct. 307 (2004).
144. See id. at 903.
145. See id. at 903 n.7.
146. See id. at 903.

147. Id. at 905.
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agreement" and was therefore illegal per se.148 The court was unmoved by
defendants' arguments that the agreement was "merely an attempt to
enforce patent rights," that this "'novel' area of law preclude[d] per se
treatment," and that "the Agreement lacked anticompetitive effects and had
procompetitive benefits."' 149 Instead, the court applied traditional antitrust
principles, relying heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society, which held a price-fixing agreement
50
between physicians illegal per se. 1
Of particular note in this case was the fact that Andrx was the first to file
an ANDA and thus possessed the 180-day exclusivity period. 15 1 In a
particularly troublesome term of the agreement, Andrx agreed not to
relinquish or transfer its exclusivity, effectively prohibiting other generic
competitors from the market as well. 152 The court viewed this term
eliminating all competition in the market for53Cardizem CD as "a classic
example of aper se illegal restraint of trade." 1
B. TraditionalRule-of-Reason Approach
1. The Eastern District of New York: In re Ciprofloxacin
The district court judge in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation also relied on traditional antitrust principles; however, unlike the
court in In re Cardizem, here the court declined to apply a per se rule in
deciding a summary judgment motion by the plaintiffs. 154 Instead, the
court granted summary judgment to the defendant pharmaceutical
55
companies based on a rule-of-reason analysis. 1
As discussed in Part I, the rule of reason requires a three-step inquiry:
(1) The plaintiff must demonstrate that the agreement in question "has had
an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market;"
(2) the defendant has the burden of establishing the agreement's "procompetitive redeeming virtues;" and (3) the plaintiff must then "show that
the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved through an alternative
means that is less restrictive of competition."' 156 Taking into account the
148. Id. at 900.

149. Id. at 908-09.
150. Arizona v. Maricopa Country Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
151. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 902.
152. See id. at 907. After this case was decided, Congress passed the Medicare Act,
amending the Hatch-Waxman Act and providing a forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity
period if the possessor has settled its litigation and if the FTC or a court has issued a final
decision finding an antitrust violation in the settlement. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V)
(Supp. III 2003).

153. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908.
154. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro 1), 261 F. Supp. 2d 188,
247 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
155. CiproII, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

156. Id. at 520 (citing K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123,
127 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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legal monopoly conferred upon patent owners, the court framed the first
step as a question of whether the agreement in question led to
anticompetitive effects that "were outside the exclusionary zone" of the
challenged patent. 157 Determining that the plaintiff had not demonstrated
158
such effects, the court did not reach the second and third steps of the test.
Several facts of this case were distinguishable from In re Cardizem. For
example, here the generic company holding the 180-day exclusivity period
amended its ANDA certification from a paragraph IV to a paragraph III,
clearing the way for other generic companies to enter the market. 159 In
addition, the agreements here resolved the underlying patent dispute, while
the agreement in In re Cardizem was an interim agreement. 160 Moreover,
there was no question in this case that the generic product would infringe
the brand company's patent,1 as the generic company so stipulated during
16
the course of the litigation.
The court refused to undertake an ex post analysis of the patent's validity
or potential invalidity. 162 In doing so, the court conceded that a rule
discounting the patent's exclusionary power by its probable invalidity
would be more likely to target weak patents. 163 However, the court was
unconcerned about not adopting such a rule, stating that if a patent were
truly vulnerable, there would not be enough economic justification for the
patentee to continue to thwart attacks from multiple challengers by issuing
reverse payments. 164 On the facts of this case, it would appear as though
such an analysis would have been unnecessary anyway, as the patent in suit
withstood validity challenges by three other generic companies, two of
which were affirmed by the Federal Circuit. 165 Therefore, even though the
157. Id. at 523. The court stated that, absent Walker Process fraud or the NoerrPennington sham exception, the primary inquiry for an antitrust violation in a patent case is
whether the restraint in question exceeds the scope of the patent. Id. at 535. In Walker
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., the Supreme Court first
recognized an antitrust cause of action in cases in which an asserted patent was procured by
fraud on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, as long as the other elements of a Sherman
Act claim are met. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
175-77 (1965).
The doctrine of Noerr-Pennington immunity was established in two
Supreme Court cases, EasternRailroadPresidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961), and UnitedMine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). NoerrPennington immunity provides a safe harbor from antitrust liability to a party pursuing an
anticompetitive outcome through litigation. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d
1227, 1233 (1 1th Cir. 2005). However, the Court provided an exception where the litigation
has no objective basis and is merely a sham to conceal an attempt to interfere with a
competitor's business relationships. Prof I Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993); Noerr Motor Freight,Inc., 365 U.S. at 144.
158. Cipro II, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
159. Cipro1,261 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
160. Id. at 242.
161. Cipro 11,363 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
162. Id. at 539.
163. Id. at 534.
164. Id. at 534-35.
165. See id. at 519-20. The third case was not appealed, and a fourth generic company
withdrew its validity challenge. See id. at 520.
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district court did not undertake an inquiry regarding the challenged patent's
validity, both the strength of the patent, as evidenced by other challenges,
and the challenger's admitted infringement supported the finding that the
agreement did not exceed the "zone of exclusion" of the patent. 166
2. The Second Circuit: In re Tamoxifen
The Second Circuit also rejected a per se rule in evaluating patent
The test
infringement settlements involving reverse payments. 16 7
articulated by the Second Circuit is whether "the 'exclusionary effects of
the agreement' exceed the 'scope of the patent's protection." ' 16 8 In
performing its analysis, the Second Circuit, like the district court in In re
Ciprofloxacin, declined to consider the likelihood of the patentee's success
at trial' 69 or the size of the reverse payment.170 Rather, the court stated that
as long as the infringement suit was not fraudulent or baseless, the primary
consideration is whether the agreement extends the patentee's monopoly
beyond the scope of the patent. 171 As did the court in In re Ciprofloxacin,
the court here applied its test and found that the agreement in question did
not reach beyond the scope of patent protection. 172 The court did not
explicitly state what the proper antitrust analysis would be given a
determination that an agreement does exceed the patent scope; however, it
did discuss the pro-competitive benefits of the settlement in question 173 and
174
largely followed the analysis of the district court in In re Ciprofloxacin,
indicating that the rule of reason is the law in the Second Circuit for
75
evaluating reverse payment settlements. 1

166. Id. at 548.
167. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 389 (2d Cir. 2005). The
district court in this case was the Eastern District of New York, which also decided In re
Ciprofloxacin.

168. Id. at 396 (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp.
2d 514, 538 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)); see also id. at 397 n.27.
169. Id. at 387.
170. See id. at 395.
171. Id. at 397.
172. Id. This appeal affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 374. The Second Circuit denied a petition
by the plaintiffs for a rehearing and rehearing en banc of this appeal. In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 03-7641 (2d Cir. Sept. 14, 2006).
173. See In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 398-400.
174. See, e.g., id. at 396-97.
175. In a lengthy dissent, Judge Rosemary Pooler agreed with the majority that a per se
approach was inappropriate. See id. at 405. However, he advocated a balancing test in which
the strength of the patent at the time of the settlement and the amount of the reverse
payment, among other things, were taken into account when evaluating legality of these
agreements. Id. at 412.
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C. Alternative Approach of the Eleventh Circuit: Valley Drug Co. and
Schering-Plough
The Eleventh Circuit has taken another approach to antitrust liability
analysis. 176 The court has rejected traditional antitrust doctrine, stating that
"neither the rule of reason nor the per se analysis is appropriate in...
antitrust analysis of patent cases because they seek to determine whether the
challenged conduct had an anticompetitive effect on the market" and, due to
1 77
the nature of a patent, "[t]he anticompetitive effect is already present."'
Instead, the court developed a novel three-part test that examines "(1) the
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the
agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive
178
effects."
In Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the agreements between Schering-Plough and two
generic competitors, Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. (Upsher), and ESI
Lederle, Inc. (ESI), did not violate antitrust laws. 179 To the contrary, the
180
court posited that the agreements actually had pro-competitive benefits.
For example, one of the agreements involved licenses of five of Upsher's
products to Schering-Plough.1 8 1 The FTC asserted that the royalty
payments to Schering-Plough exceeded the true value of the licensed
products and were actually reverse payments. 82 However, the court opined
that the licensing aspect benefited the public "by introducing a new rival
into the market, facilitating competitive production, and encouraging further
innovation."' 83 A second aspect of the agreements that the court viewed as
pro-competitive was the fact that the agreements allowed Upsher and ESI to
enter the market five and two years, respectively, prior to the expiration of
Schering-Plough's patent.' 84 In addition, the court considered the public
policy arguments in favor of settling litigation and found that the benefits of
176. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005);
Schering II, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006);
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309 (1 1th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 939 (2004).
177. Schering II, 402 F.3d at 1065-66.
178. Id. at 1066. See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1312. The Valley Drug Co. court

remanded the case to the district court, which found that the agreements in question did
violate the antitrust laws. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d
1279, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Interestingly, even after being instructed that another court had
found the agreements illegal, a jury in the Southern District of California found no antitrust
violations in the California counterpart to the Florida In re Terazosin case. See Erin Marie
Daly, Generic Drug Makers Did Not Violate Antitrust Law: Jury, IP Law 360, Apr. 7, 2006,
at 1.
179. See Schering 11, 402 F.3d at 1076.
180. See id. at 1075.
181. See id. at 1059.
182. See id. at 1068.
183. Id. at 1075 (citing Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 1780(a) (2d ed. 1999)); Hovenkamp
et al., supra note 29, at 1750-5 1).
184. Id. at 1067-68.
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settlement outweighed any ancillary restraints resulting from the
agreements. 185 Like the Second Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit declined to
86
impose limitations on the size of reverse payments. 1
D. Suggestionsfrom Outside the JudicialSystem
1. The FTC's Approach in Schering-Plough
Initially in the Schering-Plough case, an administrative law judge (ALJ)
dismissed the FTC's complaint, which alleged that settlements between
187
Schering-Plough and two generic companies violated the antitrust laws.
The ALJ found that reverse payments did not make an agreement illegal per
se; rather, the strength and scope of the patent were the determining factors
in assessing the legality of the agreement.1 8 8 The full Commission reversed
the ALJ, finding that, absent the reverse payments, generic entry into the
potassium chloride supplement market would have occurred sooner, and
that the resultant delay injured competition and consumers. 189 In doing so,
the Commission prohibited "settlements under which the generic 'receives
anything of value' and agrees to defer its own research and development,
production or sales activities." 1 90 The Commission exempted agreements
where the reverse payment is "linked to litigation costs," does not exceed
$2 million, and is reported to the FTC. 19 1
Courts and commentators have subsequently portrayed this aspect of the
FTC's order as an absolute rule to be applied in all cases involving reverse
payments. 192 In actuality, the FTC appeared to limit the rule to the
particular facts of Schering-Plough. 93 Therefore, while the rule advocated
by the FTC in Schering-Plough may look like a per se rule against reverse
payments, the FTC has stated that per se treatment is not appropriate,
"given the complexities of the patent litigation context."' 194 In fact, the

185. See id. at 1072-76.

186. Id. at 1075; In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 395 (2d Cir.
2005). In Schering I, the size of the reverse payment was particularly troubling to the FTC.
Schering I, No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651, at *22 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003), vacated, 402 F.3d
1056 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
187. See ScheringI, 2003 WL 22989651, at *8.
188. See Scheringll,402 F.3dat 1061.
189. Schering 1, 2003 WL 22989651, at *46; Schering II, 402 F.3d at 1062.
190. Schering 1, 2003 WL 22989651, at *47.
191. Id.; Schering II, 402 F.3d at 1062. In its reversal of the FTC decision, the Eleventh
Circuit called this an "arbitrary exception." Schering II, 402 F.3d at 1062.
192. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 392 n.21 (2d Cir.
2005); Schering II, 402 F.3d at 1062; Cipro II, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 528-30 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
193. See Schering I, 2003 WL 22989651, at * 18, *46 ("[W]e have crafted an order that is
appropriate in the circumstances.").
194. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, No. 05-273
(U.S. Aug. 29, 2005), 2005 WL 2105243.
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opinion of the Commission in Schering-Plough specifically stated that it
19 5
had analyzed the agreements in question under the rule of reason.
2. Views of the Solicitor General
Following the FTC's petition for certiorari in Schering-Plough, the
Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General (SG) to express the views of
the United States in a brief as amicus curiae. 196 The SG advised against
granting certiorari,1 97 stating, in part, that this case was not the appropriate
vehicle to resolve "the difficult and unsettled antitrust issues posed by the
FTC" because facts of the case were not representative of reverse payment
settlements generally. 19 8 The SG also dismissed the FTC's concern
regarding a circuit split, arguing that the unique circumstances of the In re
Cardizem case that prompted the Sixth Circuit's application of a per se
analysis were absent from this and other cases in which courts declined a
per se approach. 199
Of particular interest is the SG's suggested approach for evaluating the
legality of reverse payments. 200 The SG rejected both a per se rule and the
FTC's apparent reliance on the parties' expectations regarding the outcome
of the patent litigations. 20 1 Instead, the SG stated that "an appropriate legal
standard should take into account the relative likelihood of success of the

195. ScheringL, 2003 WL 22989651, at *9.
196. FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126 S. Ct. 544 (2005).
197. One FTC Commissioner has characterized a negative recommendation by the
Solicitor General as "the death knell for cert." Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, FTC, Exclusion
Payments to Settle Pharmaceutical Patent Cases: They're B-a-a-a-ck!, Address at the
Second Annual In-House Counsel's Forum on Pharmaceutical Antitrust 8 (Apr. 24, 2006),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/060424PharmaSpeechACI.pdf.
Commissioner Leibowitz was proven correct when the Supreme Court denied certiorari on
June 26, 2006. Schering 111, 126 S.Ct. 2929 (2006). The FTC continues to aggressively
investigate settlements involving reverse payments. Erin Marie Daly, FTC Probes Mylan
Over Provigil Settlements, IP Law 360, Jul. 31, 2006. In addition, the FTC advocates
Congressional action to address the issue of reverse payments. Barriers to Generic Entry:
PreparedStatement of the Fed. Trade Comm 'n Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th
Cong. 20 (2006) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, FTC), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/07/P052103BarrierstoGenericEntryTestimonySenate07202006.p
df.
198. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No.
05-273 (U.S. May 17, 2006), 2006 WL 1358441, at *14-15. To underscore the unusual
circumstances of this case, the amicus brief quoted the FTC's appeal brief, which
complained of "judicial pressure to settle" and admitted that this was a "stand-alone case
based on [the] relatively limited evidence." Id. at * 14 (alteration in original).
199. See id. at*16-17.
200. See id. at *11-12.
201. See id. In ScheringI, the FTC expressed the view that the very presence of a reverse
payment in an agreement indicates that the settlement is inconsistent with the litigation
outcome expected by the parties. See Schering I, No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651, at *17
(F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2929
(2006). However, the Solicitor General counsels against placing "undue weight on the
parties' subjective views of the strength of the [patent] claims." Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, supra note 198, at *12.
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parties' claims, viewed ex ante. '2 02 According to the SG, courts could
apply this standard without a full trial on the patent claims; rather, the court
could undertake a limited inquiry "into the relative merits of the patent
'20 3
claims and other relevant factors surrounding the parties' negotiations.
3. Various Approaches Suggested by Commentators
Antitrust commentators have generally been less lenient than the courts
in formulating an analysis for settlements involving reverse payments. 204
Some authors advocate a per se approach. They argue that agreements
involving reverse payments are nothing more than market restrictions
among competitors and should be analyzed under the per se rules
20 5
established by the Supreme Court for horizontal allocation of markets.
According to one author, such agreements frustrate the purpose of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, namely the facilitation of generic drug competition. 20 6
Other commentators have suggested some form of a quick-look
analysis. 20 7 For example, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp proposes that
reverse payments should be presumptively illegal, but allows for rebuttal of
the presumption. 208 The infringement plaintiff has the burden to defend the
antitrust challenge by proving that the plaintiff has a significant likelihood
of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit and that the amount of the reverse
payment does not exceed the parties' avoided litigation expenses. 209 Unlike
202. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 198, at *11.
203. Id. at * 11 n.1.
204. See In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 392 n.21; M. Elaine Johnston & Matthew J. Galvin,
Antitrust Aspects of Settling Intellectual Property Litigation, 867 PLI/Pat 159, 184 (2006)
(suggesting that the absence of argument by the plaintiffs in In re Tamoxifen that reverse
payments are illegal per se signifies the perceived acceptance by the courts of such
payments).
205. Marcy L. Lobanoff, Comment, Anti-Competitive Agreements Cloaked as
"Settlements " Thwart the Purposes of the Hatch- Waxman Act, 50 Emory L.J. 1331, 1353-54
(2001); W. Lindsey Wilson, Comment, Antitrust Solutions to PharmaceuticalAbuses: An
Examination of Agreements Between Brand-Name and Generic Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, 2001 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1227, 1251-54 (2001).
206. See Lobanoff, supra note 205, at 1354-55. The author's main objection to reverse
payment agreements is their connection to manipulation of the 180-day exclusivity period.
See id. at 1355. The passage of the Medicare Act has essentially rendered such objections
moot. See supra Part I.D.3.
207. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal
Per Se?, 47 Antitrust Bull. 491, 534 (2002); Hovenkamp et al., supra note 29, at 1759;
Maureen A. O'Rourke & Joseph F. Brodley, An Incentives Approach to Patent Settlements:
A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 Minn.L. Rev. 1767, 1787 (2003). These
articles phrase the analysis in terms of presumptive illegality, rather than "quick-look," to
distinguish patent cases from those involving typical antitrust inquiries. See Thomas F.
Cotter, Refining the "Presumptive Illegality" Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes
Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 Minn. L.
Rev. 1789, 1797 n.41 (2003).
208. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 29, at 1759.
209. Id. As noted above, at least two federal courts of appeals have rejected limitations
on the size of reverse payments. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. Professor
Cotter disagrees with Professor Hovenkamp's requirement regarding litigation expenses,
calling it "unnecessarily narrow." Cotter, supra note 207, at 1802.
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the per se approach, the quick-look model concedes that there
may be pro2 10
competitive justifications for reverse payment settlements.
Fewer scholars appear to promote a rule of reason. Seizing on procompetitive justifications, some authors point to the fact that a generic
competitor facing a risk-averse patent owner may negotiate a settlement that
will allow the generic competitor to enter the market sooner than if the
infringement litigation had proceeded. 2 11 Other commentators point to the
benefit of reduced risk of uncertainty for both the parties to the litigation
and the public. 2 12 A settlement allows the parties to move forward with
their business plans free of the cloud of pending litigation and its
accompanying legal and financial risks. 213 On the consumer side, a
settlement prevents a scenario in which a generic company has launched at
risk, only to be subsequently enjoined or lose the litigation. 2 14 In such a
case the generic company must withdraw from the market, potentially
harming consumers who have come to rely on the product. 2 15 A favorite
rationale of courts in applying the rule of reason, and one advocated by
some scholars as well, is the efficiency of settlements over litigation. 2 16 A
per se rule or even a presumptive17 rule against reverse payments might
2
discourage settlements altogether.
A survey of the cases decided by various courts demonstrates the
disparate approaches to, and outcomes of, antitrust claims against parties
who enter into patent settlement agreements.
Likewise, antitrust
commentators are in disagreement as to the appropriate level of scrutiny
such agreements should receive. The Supreme Court has passed on the
opportunity to establish a standard, leaving the uncertainties created by the
case law unresolved. Part III of this Note evaluates the tests formulated by
courts and suggested by commentators and offers a solution that strikes a
balance between antitrust law and patent law concerns.

210. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 207, at 532-38; Thomas F. Cotter, Antitrust
Implications of Patent Settlements Involving Reverse Payments: Defending a Rebuttable
Presumption of Illegality in Light of Some Recent Scholarship,71 Antitrust L.J. 1069, 1082-

83 (2004).
211. Crane, supra note 139, at 705; Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-SplittingSettlements and
the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 Antitrust L.J. 1033, 1034 (2004).
212. See James C. Burling, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements: The Battle for a
Benchmark, 20 Antritrust 41, 44 (2006); Melissa R. Leuenberger-Fisher, Case Note, In re
Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation: An Argument for the Rule of Reason, 24

Biotechnology L. Rep. 417, 425-26 (2005).
213. See Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 212, at 425.
214. See id. at 426; supra note 110.
215. See id.
216. See Kristopher L. Reed, A Return to Reason: Antitrust Treatment of Pharmaceutical
Settlements Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 457, 478 (2004-2005); supra
notes 136-142 and accompanying text.
217. See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill.
2003). Judge Posner also suggests that a per se rule could result in anticompetitive effects if
it diminishes the incentive to challenge patents "by reducing the challenger's settlement
options should he be sued for infringement." Id.
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III. DISSECTING THE OPTIONS: A REASONABLE APPROACH

Antitrust law and patent law are generally thought to be at odds with one
another. 2 18 While antitrust law is designed to prevent monopolies, patent
law is designed to grant a legal, albeit limited, monopoly to an innovator.
The chasm may not be as wide as it appears. As discussed in Part I, both
systems share the common goals of promoting innovation and
competition. 2 19 While each seeks to achieve these goals by seemingly
opposite policies, it is possible to develop a rule that promotes the common
goals without eviscerating the basic policies of either system.
Per se treatment of reverse payments "give[s] almost no weight to the
patent holder's right to exclude." 220 Indeed, some commentators who
advocate a strict per se approach appear either to misunderstand or to ignore
the patent laws entirely. 22 1 For example, one article opines, "Congress did
not provide that a patent is conclusively presumed to be valid, '222 a
statement directly in conflict with the U.S. Code, which states that "[a]
patent shall be presumed valid. '2 23 The authors explain their deviation
from the clear language of the statute with references to case law that gives
224
the courts authority both to enforce a patent and to declare it invalid.
They go on to characterize patent rights as uncertain in the absence of "a
final court resolution of the validity and scope of a patent. '2 25 This is a
strained interpretation of patent law. Patentees are granted the power "to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention" for the term of the patent. 2 26 While any patent is certainly
subject to a legal challenge, the statutory presumption of validity means that
a challenger bears the burden of proof of invalidity. 2 27 Some commentators
point to studies indicating that approximately half of all patents challenged
in litigation are invalidated. 228 However, as discussed below, it is
impractical and speculative to try to predict the outcome of litigations that

218. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 386 (2d Cir. 2005).
219. See Alden F. Abbott & Suzanne T. Michel, The Right Balance of Competition Policy
and Intellectual Property Law: A Perspective on Settlements of PharmaceuticalPatent
Litigation, 46 IDEA 1, 2 (2005); Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 212, at 417.
220. Schildkraut, supra note 211, at 1039. Some commentators, while acknowledging the
patentee's right to exclude, argue that the right to exclude does not encompass "the right to
pay a potential competitor to stay off the market." Abbott & Michel, supra note 219, at 8.
221. See Reed, supra note 216, at 475.
222. Leffler & Leffler, supra note 138, at 35.
223. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
224. See Leffler & Leffler, supra note 138, at 35 n.9.
225. Id. at 36; see also Abbott & Michel, supra note 219, at 11-12 (arguing that the
uncertain outcome of patent litigation casts doubt on the patentee's ability to exclude
competitors from the market).
226. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
227. Id. § 282 ("The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof
shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity."). Conversely, the patent owner bears the
burden of proving infringement. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859
F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir, 1988).
228. Abbott & Michel, supra note 219, at 11-12.
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have not occurred, and courts have been reluctant to do SO.229 Therefore,
although patent rights are not ironclad, the patentee is in a far less tenuous
230
position than some authors suggest, even in the face of a challenge.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand upon the
existing per se rules. 23 1 Specifically, it has eschewed the creation of new
per se rules "until the judiciary obtains considerable rule-of-reason
experience with the particular type of restraint challenged. '232 Given the
fact that the number of decisions involving reverse payments in a patent
context barely reaches double digits for all federal courts and that such
cases have only been decided by three federal circuits, it is arguable
whether the judiciary has had considerable experience with this particular
restraint.
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit's treatment of settlements
involving reverse payments has been characterized as "virtual per se
legality." 233 By refusing to apply traditional antitrust principles in a patent
context, the Eleventh Circuit has made it very difficult to prevent any
anticompetitive effects that may arise in connection with these agreements.
This is an unsatisfactory outcome for antitrust enforcement concerns.
The FTC's rule-of-reason analysis in In re Schering-Plough Corp. is
flawed because it frames the issue in a way that does not consider patent
rights. 2 34
The FTC stated that the question was "whether these
unconditional [reverse] payments were likely to have anticompetitive
effects because they delayed generic entry beyond the dates that would have
been agreed upon in the absence of the payments." 23 5 The FTC went on to
say that an entry date agreement in the absence of a reverse payment simply
reflects the parties' uncertainties with respect to the outcome of litigation,
but that the presence of a reverse payment begs the conclusion that the
generic company has agreed to an entry date that is inconsistent with its
litigation expectations. 236 This reasoning not only fails to factor patent
rights into the equation, it ignores the realities of litigation settlement. The
Commission itself acknowledged that there might be situations in which a
229. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
230. The patent owner enjoys another important advantage, in addition to the presumption
of validity: A challenger must demonstrate invalidity by clear and convincing evidence,
while the patentee need only prove infringement by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. Glaxosmithkline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). Therefore, the patentee bears the lower standard of proof.
231. See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276, 1279 (2006); Arizona v. Maricopa
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 n.19 (1982).
232. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 349 n.19.
233. Schildkraut, supra note 211, at 1039; see Leibowitz, supra note 197, at 3-4.
234. See ScheringI, No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651, at *9 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003), vacated,
402 F.3d 1056 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
235. Id.
236. Id. at * 17. The FTC was particularly concerned about the size of the payment in this
case as well. Id. at *22. Several courts and commentators have dismissed this as a
consideration in evaluating the legality of these agreements. See supra notes 170, 209 and
accompanying text.
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reverse payment was justified, such as when the generic company is "cash
starved" and needs funds up front to enter the market sooner, or in cases
where the parties' risk tolerances are disparate. 237 While the FTC's opinion
in Schering I was comprehensive, it does not provide a good model for
evaluating settlements involving reverse payments because it was fact2 38
specific and skipped the step of assessing the relevant patent rights.
In a recent address, FTC Commissioner Jon Leibowitz spoke of the threat
that the Schering II and In re Tamoxifen decisions pose to the "vitality" of
the Hatch-Waxman Act. 2 39 He supported his thesis with statistics showing
that in fiscal year 2004, prior to either decision, none of the fourteen
brand/generic agreements reported under the Medicare Act involved reverse
payments, while that number rose to three of sixteen in fiscal year 2005 and
seven of ten in the first four months of 2006.240 Commissioner Leibowitz
attributed these increases to the Schering II decision in March 2005 and to
the In re Tamoxifen decision in November 2005.241 It is likely that the
Commissioner is correct, and that these decisions did give pharmaceutical
companies enough confidence in the legality of reverse payments that they
included them in the terms of their settlements. While such settlements
may indeed "deny consumers potential access to potentially major savings,"
even Commissioner Leibowitz agrees that reverse payments "may be
appropriate" in an intellectual property context. 24 2 The FTC has taken a
position that is consistent with the Sherman Act's consumer welfare goals;
however, the FTC cannot operate on a pure policy basis if, in doing so, it
sets aside rights granted under the patent system.
The analysis used in the Second Circuit is the most sensible. The court in
In re Ciprofloxacin applied an analysis based in traditional antitrust
principles, yet considered the unique circumstances that arise in patent
cases. Under this test, the patent owner is entitled to the protection
provided by its patent, but the owner cannot extend its monopoly beyond
the scope of the patent. 2 43 Under a traditional rule of reason, the court

237. Schering L 2003 WL 22989651, at *22.

After acknowledging the possibility that

these payments could be justified, the FTC went on to find that the parties in this case did
not demonstrate such justifications. See id.
238. In fact, the author of the FTC's opinion, Commissioner Thomas B. Leary, admits
that "the Commission's opinion on Schering was not driven by any view on the appropriate
global balance between the domains of patent law and antitrust law." Thomas B. Leary,
Antitrust Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, Part III, Address at
Spring Meeting of the American Bar Association Antitrust Section 15 (Mar. 29, 2006),
available
at
http://www.hhlaw.com/files/News/05ac8357-7511-43c9-a9272c7e96a0ecde/Presentation/NewsAttachment/fd869e0b-b58a-45 1d-ad8d-2e 11 Odbb796b/Lea

ryABASpringMeetingSpeech.pdf. Instead, the Commission was concerned with achieving
the policy goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Id.
239. Leibowitz, supra note 197, at 3.
240. See id. at 4-5.
241. See id. at 5.
242. Id. at 6.
243. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th
Cir. 1997).
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would first determine the anticompetitive effects of the agreement. 244 In
cases where a patent is involved, anticompetitive effects naturally exist as a
24 5
consequence of the exclusionary nature of intellectual property.
Therefore, the analysis in a patent case in the Second Circuit starts with an
assessment of the patent's exclusionary power. 246 Only agreements that
restrain competition beyond the scope of the patent will be further
scrutinized. 247 In keeping with its efforts to uphold antitrust principles, the
court in In re Ciprofloxacin also noted that in cases involving patents
procured by Walker Process fraud or enforced under the Noerr-Pennington
248
sham exception, traditional antitrust analysis would apply.
Admittedly, there may be cases in which an evaluation of the patent's
exclusionary potential proves to be difficult. For example, in its brief
treatment of the patent issues in Schering I, the FTC emphasized that the
underlying patent litigation in that case concerned infringement by the
generic company, which is distinct from cases in which the validity of the
patent is challenged. 249 As discussed previously, the patent owner bears the
burden of proof on infringement, whereas the challenger bears the burden
on invalidity. 250 This is significant because there is a statutory presumption
of validity, while infringement must be demonstrated on a case-by-case
basis. Therefore, in cases where the validity of the patent is not challenged
(the number of which is likely to be few), the question of whether the
agreement to delay market entry exceeds the scope of patent protection is
complicated because it requires some level of inquiry into the infringing
nature of the generic company's activity. Both the courts and the FTC have
251
declined to consider the merits of the patent lawsuit in a validity context,
and it is equally unlikely that an antitrust court would embark upon an
infringement analysis. Therefore, for purposes of an antitrust analysis, we
are effectively left with the assumption that the patents in question are both
244. See Cipro II, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
245. See Schering II, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065-66 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

2929 (2006).
246. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 397 (2d Cir. 2005); Cipro I1,
363 F. Supp. 2d at 540. In setting forth the proper analysis, the court tried to tie together
some of the jurisprudence in this area, suggesting that the Eleventh Circuit's test could fit
into a rule-of-reason analysis as well. Cipro II, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 520 n.8 ("The Eleventh
Circuit's opinion can fairly be read as breaking the first step of a rule of reason analysisassessing the actual adverse effects on competition-into three steps to determine whether
there are any anti-competitive effects that exceed the scope of the patent.").
247. Cipro II, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
248. See Cipro II, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 535; supra note 157 (discussing Walker Process

fraud and Noerr-Pennington sham exception); see also In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust
Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
249. Schering I, No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651, at *19 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003), vacated,
402 F.3d 1056 (1 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
250. See supra note 227.

251. See Cipro 11, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 524-30 (reviewing the refusals of the Eleventh
Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, two federal district courts, and the FTC to undertake a validity
analysis). On the other hand, the Solicitor General advocates abbreviated consideration of
the merits of the patent suit. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 198, at
*11 n.1.
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valid and infringed.2 52 In many cases this is not an erroneous assumption,
either because of the nature of the patent 253 or because the generic company
actually admits infringement as a term of the settlement. 254 While this is
imperfect from an antitrust standpoint, it may not be as problematic under
the Second Circuit's test as it initially appears.
The Second Circuit's analysis will provide for sufficiently rigorous
review because the most objectionable cases involve settlement provisions
that are, in fact, outside of the patent's scope. For instance, one particularly
troublesome term of the agreement at issue in the Schering-Plough cases
was the term that prohibited the generic company from marketing any
competing product, not just a potentially infringing product.2 55 Another
example of a term that would exceed the patent protection is one in which
the generic agrees to stay off the market for a period of time after the patent
term has expired. Courts should not have difficulty determining whether
agreement terms provide "protection from competition which the patent
law, unaided by restrictive agreements, does not afford. '256 Provisions
such as these are clearly outside the scope of the patent, and having so
determined, a court using the Second Circuit analysis would then proceed to
evaluate the agreement under a traditional rule of reason. 257 Thus, the
analysis set forth in the Eastern District of New York and approved by the
Second Circuit charts a middle course and provides for a substantial
antitrust review after the patent aspect has been given its proper treatment.
CONCLUSION

Courts need a consistent standard for evaluating settlements between
brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies that include reverse
payments. A per se rule prohibiting such settlements is too rigid to
adequately protect the patentee's rights. On the other hand, a rule such as
the one formulated by the Eleventh Circuit, which approaches per se
legality, does not adequately address legitimate antitrust concerns.
Therefore, a more moderate rule-of-reason approach, such as that used in
the Second Circuit, is the best vehicle for analyzing such agreements
because it can be applied in such a way that the objectives and policies of
both antitrust law and patent law are preserved.

252. Former FTC Commissioner and author of the Schering I opinion, Thomas B. Leary,

notes that "[i]f it ultimately turns out that the patent is indeed valid and infringed, it is hard
to see how consumers are harmed by the settlement, regardless of whether the settlement
includes a reverse payment." Leary, supra note 238, at 3.
253. See Cipro IH,363 F. Supp. 2d at 518. The pioneer patent in this case claimed the
active ingredient, which was necessarily a component of the generic product. Id.
254. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1300 (1 th Cir. 2003).
255. See Schering I, No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651, at *7 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003), vacated,

402 F.3d 1056 (1 lth Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
256. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 279 (1942).
257. Once the second step of the analysis is reached, the guidelines set forth by the FTC
in Schering I would then be applicable and instructive.

